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Chairman
Advisory Committee to the Director, CDC 
1600 Clifton Road NE 
Atlanta, GA 30030
Dear Dr. Chairman,
On behalf of the National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee (NBAS) and in keeping with 
our mandate to ensure that the federal government is enhancing state and local government 
public health surveillance capability, I am pleased to submit the report Improving the N ation ’s 
A bility to D etect and Respond to 21st Century Urgent Health Threats. The report provides 
recommendations for action that describe how the United States could deploy people and 
technologies at all levels of government to improve the collection, flow and interpretation of data 
in a timely way as a means of preventing and mitigating threats to the health of communities.
In this report, NBAS identifies a matter of great importance to U.S. national security, namely, the 
ability to use biosurveillance capabilities to detect and respond effectively to public health 
emergencies of national significance. Effective biosurveillance is essential to the management of 
catastrophic health events; it is also essential to routine public health practice and disaster 
response.
This report is the culmination of quick work in fact-finding, consultation, and deliberation by the 
Committee. NBAS is grateful to the many individuals who shared their knowledge and 
perspective with us in the development of this report.
We appreciate the opportunity to address this important area and hope that our deliberations and 
recommendations will be helpful to you and the incoming leadership in the new administration.
Sincerely,
Larry Brilliant, MD, MPH
Chair, National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee

About the National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee
The United States has a critical national security interest in preserving the health of its 
population, livestock, crops, and natural resources. Biosurveillance is the method used to detect, 
monitor and respond to the array of threats to our national security from natural, accidental, and 
intentional origins. On October 18, 2007, the White House released Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 21 (HSPD-21) which mandates the development of a nationwide, robust, 
and integrated biosurveillance capability for human health, with connections to international 
disease surveillance systems, in order to provide early warning and ongoing characterization of 
disease outbreaks in near real-time. Additionally, HSPD-21 requires the establishment of a 
federal advisory committee, including representatives from state and local government public 
health authorities and appropriate private sector health care entities, in order to ensure that the 
federal government is enhancing state and local government public health surveillance 
capability.
In order to meet this mandate, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) was designated 
the lead to develop the National Biosurveillance Strategy for Human Health and establish the 
National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee (NBAS). NBAS is comprised of prominent. 
public and private biosurveillance stakeholders and contributors and was created by the Advisory 
Committee to the Director (ACD), CDC on May 1, 2008. As a subcommittee to the ACD, the 
National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee provides counsel to the ACD regarding the 
broad range of issues impacting the development and implementation of a nationwide 
biosurveillance strategy for human health. The membership of the NBAS ensures diverse 
perspectives important to the development of the strategy, including those from government, 
public health, health care delivery, academia and others, are reflected in the strategy’s plans.
The NBAS provides leadership and guidance to the National Biosurveillance Strategy for Human 
Health. The NBAS has begun to advance recommendations to improve the nation’s 
biosurveillance capability by developing innovative and practical solutions to challenges in the 
following areas:
• Attracting, developing and retaining a cross-trained and multi-talented workforce;
• Collaborating with global partners to strengthen local capabilities to rapidly identify and 
contain emerging health threats;
• Enhancing diagnostics and laboratory electronic information exchange;
• Improving exchange of information between public health and clinical medicine activities 
to improve accuracy and timeliness of diagnosis and reporting of health events;
• Examining the role of biosurveillance in addressing zoonotic and vector-borne diseases 
and food security;
• Integrating clinical and health information with environmental monitoring of air, toxin, 
microbiological disease threats, water quality, and infrastructure and geological disasters;
• Applying new technological advances in bioinformatics, data mining, aberration 
detection, digital scanning of open source information, analysis, and visualization 
methods while being mindful of important privacy concerns;
• Identifying solutions to cross-sector and intergovernmental collaborations for improving 
biosurveillance capability.
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Executive Summary
The ability to use biosurveillance capabilities to detect and respond effectively to public health 
emergencies of national significance (e.g., smallpox, anthrax, foodborne disease) is a matter of 
great importance to U.S. national security. Effective biosurveillance is essential to the 
management of catastrophic health events; it is also essential to routine public health practice and 
disaster response.
Disease-related events that reach the level of national consequence and/or global significance are 
rare, episodic, and unpredictable. Because of these characteristics, it is difficult to maintain 
long-term public interest, funding and prioritization. In addition, prevention activities are often 
invisible to the public and go unnoticed. Finally, the responsibilities and authorities within the 
government to prevent and respond to these events of national consequence and/or global 
significance are dispersed, put into silos and not integrated. Because of this diversity and the 
episodic but horrific nature of these events, we must use a non-traditional approach to address 
the current gap in our nation's biosurveillance capability. The approach can not rely on public 
will or a single governmental agency for success, but must be built around on-going interagency 
collaboration and coordination.
Many federal agencies and offices have responsibilities and programs that pertain to the nation’s 
overall biosurveillance mission. Moreover, much of the foundation of U.S. biosurveillance 
capacity depends on programs operated by state and local public health agencies. Efforts to 
coordinate and make sense of this broad array of biosurveillance efforts have encountered stern 
challenges
This report provides recommendations for action that describe how the United States could 
deploy people and technologies at all levels of government to improve the collection, flow and 
interpretation of data in a timely way as a means of preventing and mitigating threats to the 
health of communities.
These recommendations are offered by an esteemed group of experts from multiple disciplines 
comprising the National Biosurveillance Subcommittee (NBAS) which serves as a subcommittee 
of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Director’s Advisory Committee. The 
creation and mission of NBAS was mandated by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21 
(HSPD-21), issued in October 2007. This Presidential Directive addressed critical components of 
public health and medical preparedness and response to catastrophic health events, for example, 
a terrorist attack with a nuclear or biological weapon, an influenza pandemic, or a large-scale 
geological event. Any one of these scenarios could result in tens or even hundreds of thousands 
of casualties, and cause great societal and economic disruption and damage to U.S. national 
security.
The term biosurveillance is here intended to mean the organizational systems, people and 
technologies needed to ensure the nation’s ability to detect a biological event or other hazards to 
health that are of national significance promptly; to sustain near-real time situational awareness 
of the evolution or consequences of such threats, and to provide decision-makers and the public
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with accurate and timely information about how adverse impacts might be prevented, managed 
or mitigated. Early detection of potential threats is essential to forestalling larger scale impacts 
and may even allow interventions to eliminate some hazards before they become crises. 
Situational awareness during a crisis is critical to informed management decisions. Moreover, 
many biosurveillance systems contribute vital information about the baseline health of 
populations and the natural history of certain diseases.
The recommendations summarize the major actions that the NBAS has determined are necessary 
to build an adequate biosurveillance capacity for the nation.
• The Executive Branch must define the strategic goals and priorities of federal 
investments in biosurveillance activities and technologies, and implement a plan to 
achieve, fund and periodically assess progress toward these goals. To accomplish this, the 
White House should establish an Interagency Biosurveillance Coordination Committee 
(“the Committee”).
• The U.S. National Biosurveillance Enterprise must include global health threats in its 
purview and scope.
• The federal government must make a sustained commitment toward ensuring adequate 
funding to hire and retain highly competent personnel to run biosurveillance programs at 
all levels of government.
• Government investments in electronic health records and electronic laboratory data 
should be leveraged to improve how they serve biosurveillance and public health 
missions.
• The federal government must make strategic investments in new technologies (e.g., 
genomics, supply chain management, visualizations, display dashboards) to strengthen 
U.S. biosurveillance capabilities.
Biosurveillance is inevitably a mission that must be shared across multiple agencies. This 
characteristic has, in our view, led to chronic under-emphasis and under funding of 
biosurveillance programs. Lack of interagency investments, coordination and leadership has 
caused frequent delays in the execution of surveillance efforts. The complexity of federal-state 
collaboration and the challenges of sustaining funding for essential public health programs at the 
state and local level have further impeded efforts to improve the nation’s biosurveillance 
capabilities.
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Introduction
The United States has a critical national security interest in preserving the health of its 
population, livestock, crops, and natural resources. Biosurveillance is the method used to 
confront the array of threats to our national security from natural, accidental, and intentional 
origins. On October 18, 2007, the White House released Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 21 (HSPD-21) which mandates the development of a nationwide, robust, and 
integrated biosurveillance capability for human health with connections to international disease 
surveillance systems to provide early warning and ongoing characterization of disease outbreaks 
in near real-time. Additionally, HSPD-21 requires the establishment of a federal advisory 
committee, including representatives from state and local government public health authorities 
and appropriate private sector health care entities to ensure that the federal government is 
enhancing state and local government public health surveillance capability.
To meet this mandate, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) was designated the 
lead to develop the National Biosurveillance Strategy for Human Health and establish the 
National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee (NBAS). NBAS is comprised of prominent. 
public and private biosurveillance stakeholders and contributors and was created by the Advisory 
Committee to the Director (ACD), CDC on May 1, 2008. As a subcommittee to the ACD, the 
National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee will provide counsel to the ACD regarding the 
broad range of issues impacting the development and implementation of a nationwide 
biosurveillance strategy for human health. The membership of the NBAS ensures diverse 
perspectives important to the development of the strategy, including those from government, 
public health, health care delivery, academia and others, are reflected in the strategy’s plans.
The NBAS was formed and organized into Task Forces (see Appendix A) to research and make 
recommendations related to biosurveillance in the following initial priority areas:
• Animal, Food and Vectors
• Biosurveillance Workforce of the Future
• Cross-Sector Collaboration for Biosurveillance Strategies
• Diagnostics and Laboratory Exchange Information
• Environmental Monitoring
• Genomic Epidemiology and Digital Technologies
• Global Disease Detection and Collaboration
• Integrating Clinical and Public Health Reporting
Recommend actions from each of these Task Forces were put forward in December 2008, 
compiled and considered by the NBAS Steering Committee on January 8-9, 2009. The NBAS 
Steering Committee analysis of the recommendations from the eight priority areas identified a 
number of issues in common and much synergy. The Steering Committee then integrated these 
into five high-level and cross cutting areas. On Tuesday March 6, CDC’s Advisory Committee 
to the Director (ACD) was asked to endorse an Interim Report and move to share the report with
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members of the current Presidential Administration. By a unanimous vote, the ACD voted to 
endorse the Interim Report. This report serves as the final 2008 report of the NBAS.
Importance and Current Status of U.S. Biosurveillance Efforts
The federal government must build a National Biosurveillance Enterprise to deal with a wide 
range of potentially destabilizing, 21st century national security threats such as biological and 
nuclear terrorism, pandemic influenza, newly emerging infectious diseases, contamination of the 
food supply, and large-scale natural disasters. Without the capacity to recognize early signals of 
disease outbreaks or other population health hazards, we cannot hope to intervene successfully 
during public health emergencies and prevent additional deaths or social and economic 
disruption. Without accurate and timely information about the situation on the ground, decision­
makers cannot make informed choices about how to mitigate or contain an emergency and 
forestall catastrophe.
Disease-related events that reach the level of national consequence and/or global significance are 
rare, episodic, and unpredictable. Because of these characteristics, it is difficult to maintain 
long-term public interest, funding and prioritization. In addition, prevention activities are often 
invisible to the public and go unnoticed. Finally, the responsibilities and authorities within the 
government to prevent and respond to these events of national consequence and/or global 
significance are dispersed, put into silos and not integrated. Because of this diversity and the 
episodic but horrific nature of these events, we must use a non-traditional approach to address 
the current gap in our nation's biosurveillance capability. The approach can not rely on public 
will or a single governmental agency for success, but must be built around on-going interagency 
collaboration and coordination.
Enhancing the nation’s biosurveillance capabilities can also yield important peace-time benefits. 
A well-designed National Biosurveillance Enterprise could improve routine public health 
practice, lead to more prevention-focused and cost-effective health care, and mitigate economic 
losses associated with breaches in food safety that result in domestic recalls and barriers to 
export. Moreover, to meet its obligations under the revised International Health Regulations of 
2005, the U.S. will have to participate in efforts to strengthen disease surveillance capacities at 
home and abroad.
Today, the U.S. does not have an integrated, national approach to biosurveillance that is capable 
of responding to catastrophic health threats or to more familiar problems such as the 
contamination of food supplies. There is no overarching strategy that establishes the objectives 
of a National Biosurveillance Enterprise or that lays out the implementation plan for such a 
system. Currently, multiple authorities in many federal agencies and all 50 states engage in 
biosurveillance activities. There are more than 300 separate biosurveillance efforts underway in 
various federal, state and local government agencies. These efforts are, for the most part, neither 
integrated nor interoperable, and propose to serve an array of purposes. The effectiveness of 
many of these systems remains untested and, in some cases, undefined. Some systems appear to 
have overlapping missions, while other important surveillance needs have not received sufficient 
attention. The National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee (NBAS) has been unable to 
establish reliable estimates of the annual cost of U.S. biosurveillance programs—there is no
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Office of Management and Budget (OMB) cross-cut that would assemble total federal 
spending—but it is at least several billions of dollars. Current appropriations do not appear to be 
sufficient for the tasks at hand, although additional cost-efficiencies are surely possible.
Additional problems with current U.S. biosurveillance efforts include constraints imposed by 
federal budget and contract management policies that make it difficult to build systems agile 
enough to adjust to changing threats and contexts, and that impede opportunities to take 
advantage of— and to catalyze—technological innovation. The existing government workforce 
dedicated to biosurveillance is inadequate and ageing, but there are currently no plans to develop 
a workforce of the future that has the skills and training needed to support effective 
biosurveillance programs.
Finally, the National Biosurveillance Enterprise must be founded on the basic, routinely-used 
surveillance systems and practices of local and state public health agencies. The U.S. 
Constitution established that States have authority over and responsibility for “public health,” a 
state of affairs that has taken on important national security implications in an age of catastrophic 
terrorism, asymmetric warfare and global interconnectedness. The quality, comprehensiveness, 
and sustainability of state and local public health surveillance programs that serve as the 
foundation of our national biosurveillance capacity, vary widely according to the skill and 
funding levels of state and local health agencies. Since 2002, states received approximately $1B 
per year in federal funds for bioterrorism and pandemic flu preparedness; a significant, but 
undefined proportion of these monies were spent on biosurveillance projects. Federal funding 
for biosurveillance has enabled states both to improve routine surveillance activities as well as be 
better positioned to respond to emergency conditions.
While initial investments in biosurveillance were an important first step, the level of federal and 
state funding for biosurveillance appropriated to date is not commensurate with the strategic 
importance of these systems. Moreover, initial gains in state biosurveillance capacities are now 
threatened by both a steady erosion of federal funding for public health emergency preparedness 
and significant state budget deficits due to the economic downturn. In effect, we are asking 
states to fund systems that are essential to U.S. national security, without establishing a coherent 
planning or funding strategy to sustain the keystones of the National Biosurveillance Enterprise.
The recommendations that follow are the result of an intense study of U.S. biosurveillance 
programs by the National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee, whose collective 
membership represents extensive professional experience and knowledge of biosurveillance 
programs, applications and technologies. The Subcommittee’s assessment of current 
biosurveillance efforts revealed opportunities for improvement in five major categories: 
interagency coordination and strategy; workforce issues; opportunities to enhance 
biosurveillance through links to clinical electronic health records and electronic laboratory 
records; and new emphases on global health surveillance.
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Recommendations
How We Can Better Recognize Public Health Hazards,
Manage Crises, and Respond to Disasters
The Subcommittee recommends engaging the leadership of President Obama’s Administration to 
embrace and establish a well-functioning and cost-efficient national biosurveillance capacity.
The following high-level, cross-cutting recommendations should be considered by the newly 
appointed Cabinet officials. As part of the work of the NBAS in 2009, additional, more detailed 
recommendations will be generated and published for review by the appropriate agencies and 
parties.
1. The Executive Branch must define the strategic goals and priorities of federal
investments in biosurveillance activities and technologies, implement a plan to achieve, 
fund and periodically assess progress toward these goals. To accomplish this, the White 
House should establish an Interagency Biosurveillance Coordination Committee (“the 
Committee”).
• The Committee should be established by the White House and chaired by a representative 
from the Executive Office of the President (EOP), perhaps from the National Security 
Council or the Office of Science and Technology, and should include representatives 
from all federal agencies with a substantive stake in biosurveillance issues. Among 
federal agencies and departments, the ones that should be represented, but are not limited 
to the following: Health and Human Services/Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and 
Response (HHS/ASPR), National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Food and Drug Agency (FDA), 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), 
Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (DNI).
• The Committee should define the strategic goals and priorities of the National 
Biosurveillance Enterprise, particularly in the context of detecting and responding to 
catastrophic health events, and, in collaboration with federal, state and local health 
officials, clearly delineate the specific biosurveillance responsibilities of particular 
federal and state agencies or parties.
• The Committee should carefully consider the critical roles that state and local health 
agencies serve in contributing to the National Biosurveillance Enterprise and assess 
whether the current federal and state allocation of public health resources is adequate to 
sustain a viable Enterprise view of the national security threats the country confronts and 
how a more sustainable and coherent approach might be structured and funded.
• The Committee should ensure that federally-funded biosurveillance programs are subject 
to objective performance assessments. The effectiveness of different biosurveillance
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approaches should be examined in light of actual experiences, exercises and simulations. 
This information should be shared widely in government and the private sector.
• To assess the costs, approaches, and effectiveness of biosurveillance systems, the 
biosurveillance program itself must be well defined with clear criteria to evaluate 
activities core to achieving the program strategy, goals and objectives. To that end, the 
Committee should recommend that Congress assign a budget activity line for all 
federally-appropriated biosurveillance activities. Performance measurement and 
evaluation of biosurveillance appropriations could then be tracked and reported to the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The Committee should recommend that 
OMB conduct a cross-agency budget analysis and review of biosurveillance programs to 
ensure that critical programs are adequately funded, to eliminate redundant activities and 
to ensure that top priorities are being met.
• The Committee should consider initiating and/or leading an interagency review of food 
safety biosurveillance that meaningfully engages the appropriate agencies and private 
sector actors. Food safety is exceedingly complex scientifically, organizationally and 
politically and involves issues of human, animal and plant health. The Subcommittee 
recognizes that food safety requires urgent review and improvement.
2. The U.S. National Biosurveillance Enterprise must include global health threats in its 
purview and scope
• In today’s “flat” and richly interconnected world, the United States has compelling 
security, economic, development and humanitarian interests in global health security. 
Improving international biosurveillance capabilities should be a priority for U.S. national 
and homeland security and for U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, the revised International 
Health Regulations obligate the United States to participate in global disease surveillance 
activities.
• The EOP representative to the Interagency Biosurveillance Coordination Committee 
should lead coordination of U.S. government policy on global biosurveillance, along with 
a lead federal agency designated by the President. The designated lead agency would 
coordinate global biosurveillance policy and programs, and should improve 
communication across U.S. federal agencies and with key donor organizations.
• The EOP representative to the Interagency Biosurveillance Coordination Committee 
along with the lead agency on global health should craft, coordinate and implement 
multilateral initiatives that strengthen core capacities in global biosurveillance and 
respond to public health emergencies in order to support the effective and sustainable 
implementation of the International Health Regulations of 2005.
3. The federal government must make a sustained commitment toward ensuring adequate 
funding to hire and retain highly competent personnel to run biosurveillance programs 
at all levels of government.
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• Federal public health preparedness funding allocated to state and local health departments 
and schools of public health beginning in 2002 has greatly enhanced biosurveillance 
capacity for both emergencies and for important non-emergency public health conditions. 
As a result of this funding, a trained corps of epidemiologists and laboratory personnel 
has been created that is our current biosurveillance capacity. It is critical to maintain 
rather than allow further erosion of the public health preparedness funding that supports 
this added capacity since 2002 until the objectives and funding needs of a more integrated 
National Biosurveillance Enterprise have been defined.
• National leadership should undertake a sustained effort to recruit, hire and retain highly 
competent and properly trained personnel to plan, evaluate, design and execute 
biosurveillance programs at all levels of government. Consideration should be given to 
establishing tuition-for-service programs and to attracting technical experts to 
government with Intergovernmental Personnel Assignments (IPAs) and other 
mechanisms.
• To improve interagency cooperation and data sharing, and to enrich civil servants’ 
understanding of the resources available across the government, agencies that are a part 
of the National Biosurveillance Information System (NBIS) should establish career tracks 
that ensure that appropriately skilled and senior civil servants perform interagency 
service and participation in NBIS. Individuals who rotate through the NBIS should see 
the assignment as a growth opportunity rather than as a diversion from their career path.
4. Government investments in electronic health records and electronic laboratory data 
should be leveraged to improve how they serve biosurveillance and public health 
missions.
• The President has initiated an intense effort to establish electronic health records (EHRs) 
nationwide as a key component of health reform and of economic recovery investments. 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (H.R. 1) of 2009 has allocated $2 billion 
for development of a nationwide health information technology infrastructure that 
improves health care quality and efficiency, but also "improves public health activities 
and facilitates the early identification and rapid response to public health threats and 
emergencies, including bioterror events and infectious disease outbreaks." Priorities for 
State grants under this section should include the establishment of electronic laboratory 
reporting to public health agencies and nationwide electronic death surveillance. 
Establishing these surveillance capacities would greatly improve situational awareness 
during large-scale public health emergencies and routine public health practice.
• The Act also provides for approximately $30 billion dollars in Medicare and Medicaid 
incentives to providers who demonstrate "meaningful use" of qualified EHR systems. 
Clinical care data provide the highest quality, most specific inputs for biosurveillance of 
populations, but most commercial EHRs are not oriented toward data sharing between 
public health agencies and clinical care providers. The criteria for qualifying EHRs and 
meaningful use must include functionality and use that improves prevention by enabling 
bidirectional communication between clinicians and public health officials.
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• Widespread use of increasingly electronic clinical data for public purposes (whether in 
research, quality measurement, or biosurveillance) will require a policy foundation and 
sound network architecture for information sharing that can earn and keep the public's 
trust. This framework would also help to define and facilitate data sharing among 
federal, state, and local officials. The federal government must lead an open and 
transparent process to develop these policies, or endorse an existing set of principles such 
as the Connecting for Health Common Framework.
5. The federal government must make strategic investments in new technologies to
strengthen U.S. biosurveillance capabilities.
• The National Biosurveillance Enterprise should support and encourage innovative ideas, 
technologies and applications. Next generation biosurveillance technologies, including 
genomics-based and digital innovations could transform the way we recognize, assess, 
communicate and respond to risks to individual and population health.
• Innovation in biosurveillance technologies and approaches would be furthered by 
continuous benchmarking of performance against specific objectives such as earliest 
possible detection of pathogen or disease events; rapid agent identification with potential 
to obtain forensic data; prediction and projections of temporal-spatial progression of 
disease outbreaks and bioterror attacks; producing actionable information; advancing 
situational awareness after an event, etc.
• Many issues related to data sharing, intellectual property and federal contracting and 
regulations have high impact on the likelihood, cost and ease of designing innovative 
technology platforms and approaches to biosurveillance. The Biosurveillance 
Coordinating Committee should be cognizant of potential barriers to innovation and 
suggest efforts to minimize or remove them.
• The federal government should make strategic investments in efforts to develop rapid, 
point-of-care clinical diagnostic tests that can be used quickly to identify ill persons and 
to help isolate contagious persons from those who are well. Clinical diagnostic tests could 
have important strategic value in managing an epidemic, particularly if there were 
shortages of vital medicines or supplies.
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Conclusion and Future Year Plans
These recommendations are supported by information obtained through research and testimony 
to the Task Forces of the National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee and discussion and 
deliberation with the National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee.
Given the opportunity in time with the transition of leadership in most Federal agencies, the 
NBAS submits that this report provides initial high-level critical actions to be considered by the 
new Secretaries of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the Department of 
State (DoS), the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
and the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). The NBAS has anticipated a four 
year tenure, therefore, the NBAS is continuing to develop additional specificity to these 
recommendations as well as address additional domain areas that are important to the overall 
biosurveillance enterprise. The extensive reviews carried out in each of the Task Force domains 
resulted in recommended actions and these will provide the basis of the 2009 work and the first 
full year report in March 2010.
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